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ACCEPTABLE CAPITAL STRUCTURES:
HOW THIN IS TOO THIN?
MILTON

R.

SCHLFINGER0

The tax advantages of incorporating thin are frequently overlooked. A "thin" incorporation is one in which capital is kept down
to a minimum. In order to gain the tax advantages from such reduced capitalization, it will normally be necessary to appreciate
those advantages and to plan for them in advance. It will usually
be inadvisable to thin down a corporation's capital structure after
it has commenced business.
The principal aim of the stockholders in newly incorporated
businesses is generally to net in pocket after taxes as much profit
as possible. That aim can frequently be furthered by incorporating
thin.
Tz-IRE

METHODS FOR OBTAINING

TiH

ADVANTAGES OF THINNING

Let us take an example to illustrate the three methods of incorporating thin in order to gain for stockholders that principal
tax advantage of being able to net in pocket after taxes more than
would be the case had the capital structure not been thinned at the
very inception of the corporation. Assume a partnership in active
business, the members of which have decided to incorporate. Assume further that the value of the total assets used in the partnership business is $300,000, and that there are $100,000 of liabilities,
so that net partnership assets aggregate $200,000. If incorporation is

*This article was the basis for remarks delivered by the author to the 1952
Tulane Tax Institute, sponsored jointly by the College of Law and the College of
Commerce and Business Administration of Tulane University, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
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effected along usual and conventional lines, all S300,000 of those
assets will be conveyed to the new corporation subject to liabilities,
and stock will be taken back for the $200,000 net value of the assets.'
Now let us see what corporate profit is necessary in order for the
stockholders to derive $100,000 net in pocket from dividend distributions by that corporation. We shall assume the usual corporate
income tax rates2 and that there is no excess profits tax. 3
We shall also assume arbitrarily that dividends distributed to these
prospective shareholders will be taxed to them at their individual
bracket rates of 62%. The following table indicates that the corporation will have to derive a net income before taxes of $537,000 in order
to afford the stockholders a return of $100,000 net in pocket after
dividend taxes:
$537,000Net corporate income before taxes
274,000
Corporate income tax
$263,000
Net corporate income after taxes
Tax on dividends to stockholders at
163,000
assumed rate of 62%
Net in pocket to stockholders after taxes $100,000
'The conventional corporation's opening balance sheet will be:
Liabilities
$300,000
Assets

Capital

$300,000

$100,000

200,000

$300,000

2The income tax on corporate normal-tax net incomes is 30%; on surtax net
incomes of over S25,000 there is an additional tax of 22%, INT. REv. CODE §§13 (b) (2),
15 (b).
-Since the excess profits tax expires June 30, 1953, INT. REV. CODE §430 (a), it
has been disregarded in this and other computations.
4
1n this computation and in those which follow, the net corporate income required to afford stockholders $100,000 net in pocket after taxes is computed. In
order to simplify computations it is arbitrarily assumed that all of the corporate
income will be earned in a single year. In reality it is extremely unlikely that a
corporation of the limited size imagined would earn the assumed net incomes in
a single year. Thus, if $100,000 net income is earned each year, the conventional
corporation would take 5 years to earn the $537,000 assumed in the text. It is
likely that if the corporate earnings were thus protracted over a number of years
the stockholder net income after taxes would be more than the indicated $100,000,
because, among other reasons: (I) the benefits of more than one surtax credit
would be available; and (2) income tax rates are to be reduced, according to present
law, for both corporations and individuals for tax years starting after March 31,
1954, and Dec. 31, 1953, respectively.
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As a consequence of the assumed $263,000 dividend distribution, the
corporation will have a net worth of $200,000, and its stockholders
will have a net in pocket after taxes of $100,000.5
By contrast, if the above incorporation is thinned by $100,000,
let us see how much corporate net profit will be needed in order to
achieve for the corporation and its shareholders results identical with
those in the conventional case. Let us assume that the corporation
is thinned by having the partnership withhold from transfer to the
new corporation $100,000 of assets, so that the corporation commences
with a capital of $100,000 rather than $200,000.6 The corporation
then permits its profits to accumulate to the point where its capital
and surplus will aggregate $200,000; at that point, the thin corporation and its shareholders will be in the same position as that of the
conventional corporation above after its one year of operations. That
is, in both cases the stockholders will have $100,000 net in pocket and
the corporation will have a net worth of $200,000. The following table
indicates that the thin corporation will have to derive only $197,000
of net profits in order to replace, as it were, the $100,000 withdrawn
from the business immediately prior to incorporation:
Net corporate income before taxes
Corporate income tax
Net profit after taxes

$197,000
97,0007
$100,000

Manifestly, therefore, after one year of operations the thin corporation requires a net profit of only $197,000 to achieve exactly the
same results as the conventional corporation with a net profit of
$537,000,1 a saving of $340,000 in required net profit. If to net that
5The conventional corporation's year-end balance sheet, after the $263,000
dividend distribution, will be the same as at its beginning-of-the-year statement.
To be more precise, its excess of assets over liabilities will still be $200,000, represented by its capital account; the actual dollar amounts of those assets and liabilities might have increased or decreased since the opening. See note 1 supra.
6Such a thinned corporation's opening balance sheet would be:

Assets

$200,000

Liabilities
Capital

$200,000

$100,000
100,000

$200,000

7These examples would be substantially more spectacular if the computations
showed current excess profits taxes either at the 18% ceiling rate or the 5% "new
corporation" rate, INT. REv. CODE §§430(a), 430(e). But see note 3 supra.
sSuch a thinned corporation's end-of-year balance sheet would reflect a $200,000
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$340,000 additional profit on top of $197,000 a conventional corporation would have to gross $3,400,000 more, it follows that the thin plan
has accomplished the same dollar results as would that $3,400,000
more business, and without the chores that would necessarily accompany the handling of that increase.
In the example above, thinning was accomplished by a determination that the corporation could start with gross assets reduced to
$200,000 and with net assets reduced to $100,000; accordingly, $100,000
of partnership assets was withheld from the new corporation. Had
it been determined that $300,000 rather than $200,000 of gross assets
was necessary to start the business in its corporate life, it might still
have been feasible to withhold $100,000 by having outside lenders,
perhaps a bank, advance $100,000 to the corporation. 9 This second
thinning plan would work out the same after one year of operation
as the first thinning plan illustrated above. Thus, the partners would
have withdrawn $100,000 from the business at the time of its incorporation, and with a net profit of $197,000 during the first year, $100,000
net after taxes would have been added to corporate surplus; presumably, the $100,000 loan would be paid off at the end of the year."

net worth, being its S100,000 capital plus its year's earnings. Thus its balance sheet
might be:
Assets
$300,000
Liabilities
Sl00,000
100,000
Capital
Surplus
100,000
$300,000
$300,000
9Such a thinned corporation's opening balance sheet would be:
Assets
$300,000
Bank loan
$100,000
Other liabilities
100,000
Capital
100,000
$300,000
$300,000
1oSuch a thinned corporation's end-of-year balance sheet would show $100,000
of capital and $IO0,000 of accumulated surplus. See note 8 supra. If the stockholders had personally guaranteed the outside loan, the question might conceivably be raised whether repayment of the loan was a constructive dividend to
the stockholders. The answer would seem to be no. Cf. Ruben v. Commissioner,
97 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1938); Fred F. Fischer, 6 T.C.M. 520, 16 P-H 1948 TC MF.N.
DEC. 47,131 (1947); Estate of Edward L. Koepenik, 2 T.C.M. 143, 12 P-H 1943
TC MEm. DEC. 43,255 (1943); S. K. Ames, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1020 (1942), acq., 1942-1
Com. BULL. 1. But cf. Ray Edenfield, CCH T.C. SERV. DEC. No. 19,236 (1952)
(corporation's repayments on its notes not dividends to stockholders, court pointing
out that stockholders had not endorsed the notes).
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There is a third method of thinning. Under this plan new stockholders receive stock for only a part of the net assets turned over to
a corporation at its inception, and for the balance they receive a debt
obligation from the corporation. This third plan can be used alone
or in conjunction with the other two methods of thinning. By way of
illustration, in the example we have been using the partners might
determine that $200,000 of net assets was immediately necessary to
launch the corporation. They might convey to the corporation the
entire $300,000 of partnership assets subject to $100,000 of liabilities.
Having conveyed $200,000 of net partnership assets, they might still
thin by taking back, let us say, only $100,000 of stock and $100,000
of the corporation's notes." After one year of operation with a net
profit of $197,000, the corporation will presumably use its $100,000
of net profits after taxes to pay off those notes. The stockholders will
then be in the same position as under the other two thinning plans
(except that they will withdraw the $100,000 from the business after
it has earned that amount, rather than before incorporation in anticipation of those earnings), and the corporation's balance sheet at
the end of that year will be similar to that of the corporations under
the two other plans.1 2 The $100,000 withdrawal by the stockholdernoteholders, if recognized as a repayment of loans, will not, of course,
result in ordinary dividend tax.
To summarize down to this point, a proposed corporation can be
thinned by one or more of three plans: (1) by the stockholders withholding assets from it, which assets are not replaced by outside loans;
(2) by the stockholders withholding assets from it, which assets are
replaced by outside loans; and (3) by the stockholders taking back
debt, as well as stock, interests.
In any broad consideration of thinning corporations, there should
be kept in mind all three of the above possible plans for reducing a
corporation's capital at its birth. In discussing our narrower subject
of acceptable capital' structures, however, our primary interest lies
only in this third plan and, accordingly, we turn our attention to a
detailed discussion of it.
"iSuch a thinned corporation's opening balance sheet would be:
Assets
$300,000
Due stockholders
Other liabilities
Capital

$500,000

$100,000
100,000
100,000

$300,000

12See note 8 supra.
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Before taking up this plan, involving stockholder debt, we digress
to emphasize the importance of planning a thin corporation prior
to and at its incorporation, rather than after operations are conimenced. Any attempted thinning by an operating corporation will
generally be treated as a distribution of an ordinary dividend to its
shareholders if the corporation has accumulated earnings and profits
at the time of thinning or has current year earnings and profits as of
the end of the year. A dividend in cash or in kind will be treated as
ordinary income to shareholders to the extent of those earnings under
Internal Revenue Code Section 115 (a). If the payment is in cancellation or redemption of a part of each stockholder's shares, the same
result is likely under Section 115 (g).13 Even if there is a nominal "exchange" of a part of the old stock for new debt obligations, those obligations will probably be treated as a partial liquidating distribution
and taxed as ordinary income under the Bazley v. Commissioner 4
doctrine. And in the Emil Stein case, 15 decided before Bazley, in
which the notes received in exchange for stock apparently had not
been taxed as a dividend in the year of their receipt, the later payments on those notes were taxed as dividends under Section 115 (g),
perhaps on the theory that a series of liquidating payments resulting
from cancellation of a part of stock outstanding is just as much subject
to Section 115 (g) when evidenced by a note as when not so evidenced.
In brief, the time to thin a corporation is at its inception. That
there is a huge premium on proper advance planning seems evident.
WHEN A DEBT IS A DEBT

Relationship of Stockholder Debt to Capital
In order for stockholders to receive from the corporation under
this third plan $100,000 free of taxes, it is necessary that the $100,000
repayment on that advance be treated as repayment of a debt, rather
than as payment on a stock interest. This is true because if the as1sSuch dividend treatment is particularly probable when the payments are pro
rata among all stockholders. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.115-9; Kirschenbaum
v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 726 (1946).
But cf. Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 GuN,. BULL. 2 (no dividend
tax on distribution of fire insurance proceeds, business having contracted).
14331 U.S. 737 (1947).

1546 B.T.A. 135 (1942).
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serted debt be treated as stock, then the repayments will be treated as
in redemption of part of the corporation's outstanding stock; in that
event it is almost a certainty that those payments will be treated by
the Commissioner as "essentially equivalent" to an ordinary dividend under Internal Revenue Code Section 115 (g).16 Such statutory
treatment of redemption payments to stockholders as dividends, however, is expressly confined to cancellations and redemptions of stock.
There is no statutory authority for treating the payment of a debt as
a dividend even though the payment be made to a shareholder.
From the fact that the Section 115 (g) dividend treatment applies
to payments on stock but not to payments on a debt, our concern
lies in inquiring when an alleged debt owing to a stockholder will
be recognized as an obligation rather than as a proprietary interest.
Singularly enough, there appears to be no reported case in which
the Commissioner has attempted to treat payments on an asserted
stockholder debt incurred upon incorporation as payments on stock
1
for purposes of dividend tax under Section 115 (g). In Emil Stein,"
discussed above, the Board of Tax Appeals did apply Section 115 (g)
to payments on a note, but that note had been issued in exchange for
some of the previously outstanding stock. Since the Board in its opinion took no cognizance of the difficulty of the application of Section
115 (g) to note payments, we may presume that the Board thought of
the payments as relating to the previously outstanding stock, with the
note being merely evidence of the corporation's obligation to make
those payments. It follows, therefore, that the Stein case probably
did not involve the treatment of a note as stock under Section 115 (g),
and at any rate did not involve such treatment of a note issued
originally upon incorporation.
In spite of the Stein case, therefore, the fact is that the Commissioner has never in any reported case attempted to apply Section
115 (g) so as to tax as dividends repayments on stockholder advances
made at the time of incorporation. Recently, however, a taxpayer
(and not the Commissioner) has successfully asserted the application of
Section 115 to principal payments in retirement of such a supposed
debt interest.
Some years ago, in 1432 Broadway Corporation,R the Tax Court
icSee note 13 supra. It is assumed, of course, that the corporation has accumulated earnings and/or current-year earnings.
1746 B.T.A. 135 (1942).
184 T.C. 1158

(1945), aff'd per curiam, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947).
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held that a corporation could not deduct payments on asserted debenture notes as interest, finding that those notes were really stock
and the payments thereon accordingly dividends. The recently reported decision of Bauman v. United States's is the sequel to that
earlier decision. In this case it appeared that the 1432 Broadway
Corporation not only had been paying upon this asserted debt the
periodic interest held to be dividends in that earlier case, but in
addition had been making, in the years 1932 to 1942, alleged principal
payments in retirement of that supposed debt. The corporation having sold its property in 1946, it made complete liquidating payments
in 1946 and 1947 to its stockholders, among them the taxpayer. In
the Bauman case the taxpayer sought to compute her gain arising
upon the 1947 liquidating payments by applying against those payments the entire basis of her advances to the corporation, undiminished by the principal payments previously received-this on the
theory that those principal payments, relating to stock and not to
notes, should have been taxed to her as dividends. Taking the contrary position, the Commissioner sought to compute her gain by reducing the basis of those advances by the amount of principal payments thereon. The Court held for the taxpayer, relying on the
1432 Broadway Corporation decision that the advances had been for
a stock rather than for a debt interest, the Court observing that debt
treatment in the Bauman sequel would be paradoxical.
The Bauman case, which is believed to be clearly correct, has a
dual significance for us. In the first place, it indicates in a singularly
strong fashion that cases dealing with the debt versus stock question
in contexts other than Section 115 (g) are persuasive in resolving the
same question under Section 115 (g).20 Thus, 1432 Broadway Corporation dealt with the debt versus stock question for the ultimate purpose of determining whether periodic payments were deductible as
19Bauman v. United States, P-H FED. TAX S.av.

72,646 (E.D. Mo. 1952).
-oThe Bauman case perhaps does not form quite as neat a §115(g) pattern as
the text suggests. For some unexplained reason, it appears that the taxpayer
grounded her complaint for refund only upon §115(a) and not upon §115(g), at
least in the alternative. The case was disposed of on the ground that the payments were dividends under §115 (a). If, however, the debenture notes were viewed
as preferred stock, as they were, and if the principal payments were viewed as
periodic redemptions of those shares of preferred stock, as they apparently should
have been, then the dividend tax would lie under §115(g) rather than under
§115 (a).
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interest on debt or nondeductible as dividends on stock; in Bauman
that earlier decision was persuasive in resolving the same debt versus
stock question for the ultimate purpose of determining whether ostensible debt repayments should have been treated as stock redemptions taxable as ordinary dividends. In the second place, the Bauman
case will surely prove to be an unfortunate victory for taxpayers in
general. The decision is a bold invitation to the Commissioner to attack debt repayments by over-thinned corporations as being in reality
dividends to the advancing stockholders under Section 115(g); it
is indeed unlikely that so pointed an invitation will long go unanswered, particularly in view of the increasing practice for stockholders
to thin corporations by taking back debt as well as stock interests,
and of the large tax deficiencies which are apt to arise if Section 115 (g)
be applied to repayments of those asserted debts. We may anticipate
with virtual certainty considerable further litigation on the question
in the future, despite its comparative absence up to this time.
While the question of whether a stockholder advance upon incorporation should be treated as giving rise to a debt or a proprietary interest for purposes of Section 115 (g) has arisen only in Bauman,
there are numerous cases involving this question arising in various
other contexts. For example, the same question arises in determining
whether corporate payments are deductible as interest on debt or
nondeductible as dividends on stock, as witness the 1432 Broadway
Corporation controversy discussed above as well as other cases, 2' in
determining whether a loss on an advance is deductible as a bad
debt or as a stock loss, 22 and in determining whether a corporation,
in computing its excess profits credit, has given a debt or a proprietary interest in exchange for assets transferred to it.23 As we have
seen in our consideration of the Bauman case, the debt versus proprietary interest question in those other cases is presumably identical
with that which will arise if the Commissioner pursues the question
of whether Section 115 (g) may be applied to corporate payments on
such stockholder advances for asserted debt interests. The issue
would appear to be identical, and the determination that a stockholder advance is for a debt or a stock interest in one context would
appear to be persuasive, if not conclusive, in the other.
In view of the significance of the other decisions raising the debt
21E.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
22E.g., Dobkin v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
23E.g., Swoby Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 887 (1947).
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versus stock question to the resolution of that same question for our
Section 115 (g) purposes, we turn now to an extended consideration
of those other cases.
In view of (1) the Commissioner's frequent attempts in other
connections to treat stockholders' advances as having been given
in exchange for stock rather than for debt, (2) the increasing practice
for stockholders to thin corporations by taking back debt as well as
stock, and (3) the large tax deficiencies which are apt to arise if
Section 115 (g) be applied to payments on those asserted debts, it is
surprising to find that the question of applying Section 115 (g) to
payment on a debt incurred upon incorporation has arisen in only
one reported instance. It appears probable that a great deal of
further litigation on that issue is to be expected despite its comparative absence up to this time.
The case of Talbot Mills v. Commissioner24 deserves our particular attention because in it the Supreme Court faced the question
of whether the capital structure of a corporation had been overly
thinned so that stockholder advances should have been treated as
stock rather than debt. While affirming a Tax Court decision that
payments in that controversy were not deductible as interest on a
debt, 25 the Supreme Court had this to say on the thinning issue: "As
material amounts of capital were invested in stock, we need not consider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock investments and an obviously excessive debt structure." 26 The capital in
the Talbot Mills case was S100,000, and the ratio of stockholder debt
to that capital was 4:1.27
The Supreme Court's statement in Talbot Mills was the authoritative handwriting on the wall. Certainly the extent of stockholder
24326 U.S. 521 (1946).
2
51n John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), a companion to
the Talbot Mills case, the Supreme Court refused an interest deduction. The disparity in the decisions is perhaps not justified by any differences in the facts. In
both cases, however, the Supreme Court affirmed Tax Court decisions. Blame for
inconsistency, if such there was, lies with the trial and not the appellate court,
in view of the Dobson rule, still vital at the time of those decisions.
26326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
7Stock having a par value of $500,000 was originally issued. Four fifths of
that stock was exchanged for $400,000 of notes. The debt to capital ratio was
4:1, based, however, on the original capital. While the ratio based on net worth
at the time of the recapitalization does not appear, the company had been losing
money, and presumably a debt to capital ratio based on then values would
have been higher than 4:1.
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thinning is a factor bearing upon a determination of the debt versus
stock question. Indeed, although a stockholder "debt" be just that
in every conventional respect on its face-definite maturity date, unconditioned interest payment requirements, and unqualified enforcement rights on default-nevertheless, at some point the ratio of stockholder debt to stock will be overwhelming enough to force the conclusion that the debt is actually a proprietary interest. Suppose the
transfer to a new corporation of $10,000,000 for 1.00 of stock and
$9,999,999 of notes, regular on their face in every respect. A concession that the notes really represent a proprietary interest in that
extreme case-and it is believed that even the most tenacious will so
concede-is necessarily a concession that thinness does become a
material factor at some point, that thinness introduces a question of
degree.
There are, of course, other factors besides the dollar amount of
capital and the ratio of asserted stockholder debt to capital that go
toward a determination of the debt versus stock question. Cases since
the Talbot Mills decision, however, support the view that as a rule
of thumb a ratio of less than 4:1 is likely not to result in grief for the
taxpayer, whereas a ratio in excess of that is apt to preclude a finding
of debt.
Although the Talbot Mills opinion gives comfort when the ratio
is pushed as high as 4:1, the tax advantages of thinning beyond 2:1
are small compared to the risk of having the debt treated as stock by
an examining agent, if not by a court. Assume that $200,000 of net
assets are to be conveyed in exchange for stock and debt. A 2:1 ratio
will give about $138,000 of debt; doubling the ratio by pushing it
up to 4:1 raises the debt to $160,000, an increase of only 527,000. As
a practical matter, it will seldom be wise to push the ratio above 2:1.
The accompanying table enumerates cases decided for the most
part since Talbot Mills, in which the debt versus stock question has
been presented and in which the courts seem to have relied on the
adequacy or inadequacy of capital or, what is perhaps the same or
at least a related factor, the ratio of stockholder debt to capital. Because the ratio of stockholder debt to capital is only one factor
bearing upon a resolution of the question, various other factors are
also set out in the table.
The cases in the table have been arranged in progressive order
of the ratio of stockholder debt to capital; cases involving small
ratios appear first and those involving outlandish debt ratios appear

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss4/1
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last. This arrangement graphically portrays that taxpayers have
been successful in maintaining advances as debt in low stockholder
ratio situations (cases appearing early in the table) and unsuccessful
when the debt ratio was high (cases appearing late in the table).
Three cases treating stockholder advances as debt deserve particular
attention because the Commissioner has acquiesced in them. The
holding in Pierce Estates, Inc. (No. 1)28 is not surprising because the
ratio of stockholder debt to capital was only 1:4, although there were
various other weakening factors. The Tax Court took express recognition of that not unfavorable conservative ratio of debt to capital when
it said, "The ratio of the two was not of such character as to make
it appear that in reality the notes indicated an investment in the
corporation." 29 The Commissioner has also acquiesced in the finding
of debt in Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp. (No. 2). In that case
also there was a very conservative debt to capital ratio, only 1.4:1.
Finally the Commissioner has acquiesced in Ruspyn Corp. (No. 5),
in which the ratio was 3.5:1.
Illustrative of the extreme at the other end of the debt to capital
ratio scale is the Swoby case (No. 13). The Tax Court there utilized
an opportunity to pass on an excessive debt to capital structure soon
after the Supreme Court had found no necessity to consider such a
situation in Talbot Mills. In Swoby the ratio of stockholder debt
to capital was 1250:1, and when account was taken of outside debt as
well the ratio of aggregate debt to capital ascended to the astronomical height of 2675:1. No one should have been seriously shocked at
the decision that the advances were in return for a proprietary interest.
The Cleveland Adolph Mayer and Pierce cases involved respectable, if not conservative, ratios, while the Swoby case portrayed an
extreme at the other end of the scale. What of the more difficult inbetween situations, however, where the stockholder debt ratios are
substantial but not outlandish? Since in Talbot Mills a ratio of 4:1
obtained express approval albeit by way of obiter, one may deduce
that a smaller ratio than 4:1 will not militate heavily against a debt
finding. At the other end of the scale, however, one cannot deduce
from the favorable Talbot Mills dictum how much higher than 4:1
may be ventured without serious concern.
As already indicated, the lower court cases in the table seem to
indicate that the break on the high side as well comes at approximately
2SNumbers in parentheses appearing following case names in the text and
footnotes refer to citations in the table.
2916 T.C. 1020, 1024 (1951).
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4:1. It is not suggested that there is a 4:1 rule. But above that ratio
courts take an extremely dim view of debt.
Subject, then, to the omnipresent qualification that the stockholder debt ratio is only one of several factors entering into the
debt versus stock question, it may be ventured that a ratio of about
4:1 is a rough rule of thumb, not a hard-and-fast rule but a useful
guide which the incorporating lawyer'should not overlook.
Two cases in the appended table are exceptions to this approximate 4:1 rule of thumb. Both underscore the caution against any
attempt to determine this question based upon the ratio factor alone.
In the Smith case (No. 8) the Tax Court recognized stockholder advances as debt in spite of the rather substantial 9.5:1 ratio. Of overwhelming importance, however, was the fact that the advances by the
stockholders were not at all proportionate to their stock holdings. In
view of that factor of disproportion the holding is not at all surprising; nevertheless, the Tax Court split in its decision, with six
dissents, and the Commissioner has entered his formal non-acquiescence in the finding.
In another case the exception to the 4:1 rule of thumb was on
the other side of the line; while the ratio was favorable the advances
were nevertheless held to be stock. In the much-discussed and muchfeared Schnitzer case (No. 4), both the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit treated an asserted bad debt loss as a
stock loss, even though the ratio of stockholder debt to capital was
only 3:1. There were, however, other factors that tilted the scales
heavily against the taxpayer. There was a secured RFC loan to which
the stockholders' advances were subordinated. The ratio of aggregate stockholder and RFC loans to capital was 6.7:1. Furthermore,
this RFC loan had been personally guaranteed by the shareholders.
It would seem that when an outside loan has been personally guaranteed by the shareholders that loan might very well be treated as having
been made by the shareholders themselves for purposes of determining whether the corporation has been overly thinned. Two
other factors counted heavily against the taxpayer. Although in almost
all of these cases in which the question of debt versus stock has arisen
the advances of stockholders have been proportionate to their stock
ownership, the proportion feature appeared in particularly vulnerable
form in the Schnitzer controversy. While the advances to a familyowned corporation had bedn made disproportionately, there was an
agreement within the family that the losses would be borne propor-
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tionately. What was perhaps worse than any other factor in the case
was the corporation's original failure on its books to treat advances
unequivocally as loans. Originally all contributions by shareholders
had been lumped in one account payable, and only subsequently was
this account payable broken down into a stock and bond account. At
first blush, then, the Schnitzer case, involving an apparent ratio of
only 3:1, is extremely disturbing. But in light of these other weakening factors, it cannot be viewed as serious discouragement to an incorporating lawyer's use of the rough 4:1 guide.
Factors Other Than Stockholders' Debt to Capital Ratio
The Smith and Schnitzer decisions indicate the serious error that
will be made if the stockholder debt to capital ratio is isolated without consideration of other factors as well. Accordingly, while confining our discussion to cases in which that factor has been recognized
by the courts, we should turn our attention to some of the other relevant factors in those same cases.
Outside Loans (column C on the table). It may be assumed that
even though a given ratio of stockholder debt to capital might succeed in a situation where the corporation is free of outside debt, the
same ratio may prove fatal when the corporation is also financed by
loans from outsiders. It might be that the nature of these outside
loans has some bearing on the extent of their influence. Thus, trade
accounts payable might not loom as an important factor, whereas a
secured loan from a bank should have considerable bearing on the
question. In the Schnitzer case there was not only a secured outside
loan but it was personally guaranteed by the shareholders. The opinion has already been expressed that for ratio purposes a stockholderguaranteed outside loan probably ought to be tantamount to a stockholder advance.
In the Dobkin case (No. 10) the Tax Court aggregated mortgages
by outsiders with stockholder debt in emphasizing the high ratio of
debt to capital and in concluding that the stockholder debt should
be treated as stock. In that connection the Tax Court said:30
"Taking into account the $44,000 of first and second mortgages, the effect of this designation was to give the corporation
3015 T.C. 31, 33 (1950).
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a debt structure of $70,000 as against a capital stock investment
of $2,000, or a ratio of 35 to 1 of indebtedness to capital stock."
The Dobkin case, therefore, indicates the weight which the Tax
Court will accord to outside debt; it is a particularly strong indication because, while the report does not expressly so indicate, it may
be presumed that the outside debt was not personally guaranteed
by the stockholders and, indeed, that the corporation took merely
subject to the two mortgages.
Secured vs. Unsecured Advances (column D on the table). In all
the cases represented in the table, the stockholders' advances were unsecured. In the course of events it is hardly to be expected that the
question of debt vs. stock will seldom arise when the stockholders'
advances are substantially secured. Of course, if the security is of
a junior variety and is of no actual protection, the nominal security
will presumably carry little or no weight. The actual securing of a
stockholder debt position ought to be a favorable, if not conclusive,
factor. 31 In actual practice, however, it will frequently be inadvisable,
tax considerations notwithstanding, for stockholders making advances
to place themselves in a secured position and thus impair their
corporation's day-to-day operations.
Express Subordination (column E on the table). A subordination
of the shareholders' debt rights to those of other creditors is of course
an unfavorable factor. The subordination might result from secured loans to outsiders or, worse yet, from an express subordination
by the advancing stockholders, giving all other creditors priority.
Obviously the latter type of subordination would make the debt
3 2
position particularly vulnerable.
Contemporaneous vs. Later Advances (column F on the table).
One might suppose that the making of stockholder advances and
payments for stock contemporaneously would militate against the
3'Andersen Corp., 5 T.C.M. 392, 15 P-H 1946 T.C. Mmt. DEC. f46, 116 (1946)
(Commissioner unsuccessful in attempt to treat as stock indebtedness secured by

first mortgage on real estate).
2

3 1n some cases debt positions have been sustained even in the face of ex-

press subordination, e.g., Kelly v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Commissioner v. Page Oil Co., 129 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1942); Andersen Corp., supra
note 81.
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advances being classified as debts, on the ground that a simultaneous
transfer of assets may be treated in its entirety as a single payment
for an ownership interest. On the other hand, if later advances were,
or at least should have been, anticipated from the inception, and
particularly if they were started soon after the incorporation, it
would seem that they should be given no different treatment from
contemporaneous advances 33 If the later advances were not reasonably anticipated, then presumably the case for a debt finding is
stronger than when stockholder advances are contemporaneous. Since
we are concerned here, however, with the planning of a corporation's capital and debt structure at its inception, there is little point
in discussing unanticipated later advances. It is sufficient to say that
the deliberate postponement of advances that otherwise would have
been contemporaneous with the stock payment serves a dubious purpose.
Proportion of Stockholder Advances to Stockholdings (column
G on the table). This factor is extremely important. If the advances
are made disproportionately by the shareholders, particularly when
the disproportion is substantial and the stockholders are not closely
related,3 4 it would seem extremely difficult for a court to avoid debt
treatment 5 In such a case, as among the disinterested parties themselves dealing at arm's length, the advances would be debts, and the
arm's length treatment ought to be persuasive of characterization for
tax purposes as well. We have already seen that this disproportion
feature tipped the scales in favor of a debt finding in the Smith case
(No. 8), in spite of a 9.5:1 stockholder debt to capital ratio. Proper
planning of a thin incorporation requires recognition of the advisability of bona fide disproportionate advances whenever there are no
practical objections to that course by the stockholder group. Unfortunately, however, in many cases such disproportion will not be
feasible, because the optimistic stockholder wants the money he advances to procure for him the largest possible share of the ownership
interest in the business.
-3See Weldon D. Smith (No. 8).
34Cf. Arthur V. McDermott, 13 T.C. 468 (1949), acq., 1950-1 Cum. BuLL. 3 (disproportionate advances within a family of shareholders recognized as debt).
35Cf. Janeway v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1945) (grossly disproportionate advances treated as stock, but apparently advancing shareholders paid
nothing for the stock, some of which was issued to a non-advancing promoter).
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Interest Payment Requirement (column H on the table). This
and the next two factors bear upon the regularity of the debt upon
its face. That interest must be paid upon predetermined dates in any
event is one factor favoring a finding of debt. The situation becomes
unfavorable when there is a condition on payment at a definite date
but unpaid interest is cumulative. Still more unfavorable is such a
condition on payment itself, without any cumulative feature. The
condition in either case may turn upon some objective standard, such
as the presence of net earnings, or, worse yet, upon the whim of a
board of directors. 3G It is believed that in most cases it will be feasible
to put no condition in the way of the interest payment requirement,
and that proper tax planning requires recognition of the disadvantageous significance of such a condition.
Maturity Date (column I on the table). A fixed maturity date
should be set. In determining the term, however, it becomes necessary
for the planner to steer a true course between Scylla and Charybdis.
Short maturity invites default; long maturity invites analogy to
stock. If default occurs, the Commissioner has been given a telling
argument against treatment as a debt. 37 On the other hand, in one
case in which the maturity date was 99 years the court adopted the
reasonable view that the maturity was so far postponed as not to
suggest an obligation to repay at all.3s It might be that a maturity
of around ten years is safe; 39 and it may be hoped if not expected that
the corporation will anticipate its obligation at least in part.
Consistent Nomenclature (column J on the table). The advances
should be designated as debt, should preferably be evidenced by
asIn Schaefer (No. 3) the indebtedness was recognized even though the payment
of interest on time was subject to the directors finding that net income would
permit the payment; unpaid interest was cumulative.
3?Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc., 7 T.C.M. 406, 17 P-H 1948 T.C. MrEs.
Dac. ff48,123 (1948), reversed, 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949).
3sSwoby Corp. (No. 13).
39The widespread practice of taking back short-term notes or of evidencing
the debt merely as an open account will result in taxable gain whenever the property transferred to the new corporation is worth more than its basis to the transferor, INT. Rnv. CoDE §§112(b)(5), 112(c)(1). This, as well as other thinning
pitfalls not within the scope of this article, have been elaborated on elsewhere.
See Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61
HARv. L. REv. 50, 58-78 (1948).
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notes or bonds, and the books, tax returns, financial statements, and
information supplied to credit agencies and other outsiders should
all accurately reflect the debt structure.40 It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of this factor of consistency. In one case
the taxpayer lost the decision in the Tax Court due in no small
measure to the inconsistent designation of the account as "stock"
on its books and upon its tax return, 41 although it managed to scrimp
through with a reversal by an appellate court that gave more weight
than the Tax Court to a belated correction of its books to reflect the
obligations.4 2 The emphasis on the inconsistent treatment by the
Tax Court and the taxpayer's ultimate victory only by virtue of a
reversal underscore the importance of properly labeling the advances. There is no reason save poor planning for any misstep on
this account, unless for credit purposes there is a desire to show the
advances as stock rather than as debt. In the latter event the taxpayer
does not deserve debt treatment. In brief, if the advances are really
intended to be debt, the treatment of those advances should be consistent with that intention at all times.
Unqualified Right to Enforce Payment on Default. 'When a single
bondholder may not sue alone but has to obtain the joinder of a
certain percentage of others, such a qualification is an unfavorable
factor. 3 Proper advance planning requires recognition that such a
limitation on a stockholder-creditor's rights will generally have little
practical advantage, while it will have much disadvantage tax-wise.
Additional Factors. The above factors have all played a part, and,
it is submitted, a proper one in determining whether stockholder
advances are in return for debt or stock. The courts frequently mention various other factors which, it is believed, ought to carry little if
any weight. Indeed, these reasons frequently have the aspect of
rationalizations for conclusions previously reached.
In finding that stockholder advances are for stock rather than for
debt, the courts frequently remark that the advances are being "placed
40

1n addition to cases in the table, refer to Alma de B. Spreckels, 8 T.C.M.
1113 (1949), in which the consistency factor was emphasized by the court in
recognizing debt.
4'1Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc., supra note 37.
4-2Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 718 (9th
Cir. 1949).

131432 Broadway Corp. (No. 16).
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at risk in the business,"4 4 and that the chances of repayment depend
upon the earnings of the corporation.45 In every case, however, an
advance is placed at risk in the debtor business (certainly when it is
unsecured and, strictly speaking, even when secured). In almost
every case a debtor expects to repay the loan out of earnings; and that
is the expectation whether the creditor is a third party or the shareholder himself and whether the ratio of debt to stock is 1:1000 or
1000:1. In most cases debt is incurred in order to facilitate the earning
of profits, and it is those profits which will be used to liquidate the
debt. The finding of such business risk and earnings expectation
features-those features obtaining almost universally-can be of no
assistance in determining the question of debt versus stock in a particular case.
In the Schnitzer case (No. 4), widely regarded as disturbing, and
holding that advances were for stock rather than for debt, the Tax
Court emphasized that the advances were used to erect permanent
assets,4 6 a rolling mill. In answer, the argument might well be made
that an advance in order to finance the purchase of a permanent asset
has more security generally than an advance for working capital
needs. At worst, the two situations ought to rank as an even standoff. Indeed, a scant one-half year after its condemnation of advances
because of their employment for permanent assets, the Tax Court
remarked that the use of funds for fixed assets does not show or tend
to show'17 a capital contribution. It is believed that the latter view,
although appearing in a memorandum opinion, is the preferable one.
In many cases the courts have said that it is the intent of the
parties which will control.4 8 Perhaps this is not a single factor but
rather a conclusion following from an aggregate of factors. It might
be true that when parties never intended an advance to be a debt, as
when the alleged debt is labeled "stock" and is shown as stock on
books, financial statements, and tax returns, then the intent of the
parties should control (see column J on table); we are then speaking
not of subjective intent but of the outward evidence of intent. On
the other hand, parties might very well intend advances to be debt
rather than stock when the ratio is 1000:1; yet obviously their in44See, e.g., Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31, 33 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1951); Hilbert L. Bair (No. 14).
45See Isidor Dobkin, supra note 44, at 34.
4o13 T.C. 43, 59 (1949).
47See Alma de B. Spreckels, 5 T.C.M. 49 (1949).
481432 Broadway Corp. (No. 16); Kipsborough Realty Corp. (No. 12).
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tention will not control, regardless of their subjective intent and
of their intent as evidenced by an obligation regular on its face, by
consistent books and otherwise.49 It might be, of course, that in
those extreme situations their intention is motivated primarily with
an eye for tax savings. But even if qualified with a bona fide condition
-that is, an intention formed with naive disregard for tax consequences-the intention test will not stand analysis. It is quite possible
that solely out of regard for tax savings stockholders will take a debt
interest, a favorable debt to stock ratio of 1:1000 resulting. Presumably
the debt will nevertheless be recognized as such. In brief, the intention of the parties not to have a debt is perhaps controlling; but
their affirmative intention to have a debt has little, and indeed probably nothing at all, to do with the question,50 at least in the absence
of objective factors.
The courts have sometimes refused debt treatment on the ground,
inter alia, that third parties would not have made the loans.5 ' While
not so clearly immaterial as some of the factors discussed above, it
is questionable whether this "reason" is of any assistance in arriving
at a conclusion. By way of example, let us suppose that prospective
stockholders can interest an outsider in advancing on a first mortgage
on real estate, providing the maturity be ten years or shorter. The
prospective mortgagee's proposal is unacceptable, however, because
a maturity of less than twenty years is not feasible for this business.
Accordingly, the stockholders advance against a first mortgage with
the longer maturity. Or, suppose the maximum outside loan obtainable is $100,000, but the stockholders, desiring a larger loan, advance
$150,000. Should their inability to interest third party lenders in
such loans preclude treatment of their advances as a debt or even
militate against such treatment? The fact is that in many situations
stockholders are willing to lend money to their own corporations,
49In one case, Janeway v. Commissioner (No. 15), evidence of the advancing
stockholders' debt intention was clear, but they had paid nothing for the stock.
The court noted the parties' argument respecting their intention, but nevertheless found no debt interest.
5OThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the intention test affirmatively in reversing a Tax Court determination of no debt, emphasizing the Tax
Court's finding of a debt intention, Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc., 175
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949). There had been testimony of such intention and documentary evidence pointing in both directions. It is not clear, therefore, whether

the appellate decision stands for the significance of affirmative, subjective intent.
5'Matthiessen v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 781 (1951), aft'd, 52-I USTC 9201
(2d Cir. 1952); Kipsborough Realty Corp. (No. 12); Swoby Corp. (No. 13).
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because of both their confidence in the business and their proprietary
interests, when other lenders would take an extremely dim view; in
many such situations it is generally accepted that the debt is nevertheless a debt. An inevitable concomitant of an extreme debt ratio
is the unwillingness of third parties to lend. That is not to say that
such unwillingness is itself a reason for non-debt treatment; the
latter conclusion should follow directly as a result of the ratio.
No discussion of immaterial factors would be complete without
turning to that ubiquitous bugaboo, the business purpose doctrine.
In its pervasive fashion, it has intruded even into this field. In 1946
the Tax Court was expressly and definitely committed to the irrelevance of the business purpose doctrine in determining whether
advances were debt or stock.5 2 In 1948 the Court of Appeals for the
3
Second Circuit held in O'Neill v. CommissionerM
that losses suffered
by a stockholder on his advances to two wholly owned corporations
were stock and not bad debt losses. The two corporations had held
real estate. Finding that the purpose for the corporate form had been
to eliminate the necessity of the taxpayer's obtaining his wife's signature on deeds, the court concluded that a business purpose was lacking, certainly a dubious proposition at best,5 4 and that therefore the

Commissioner could disregard the corporate form s5 and treat the loss
as a stock rather than a bad debt loss, a non sequitur from the dubious
56
proposition.
52Cleveland Adoph Mayer Realty Corp. (No. 2); Anderson Corp., 5 T.C.M. 392,
15 P-H 1946 T.C. MEM. DEc. 46,116 (1946).
53170 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 937 (1949).
54For the early part of its life one of the corporations had held title to petitioner's personal residence; it subsequently acquired other property, presumably
for income or profit purposes. The case for a finding of no business purpose was
easier as to that corporation than as to the other corporation.
5.The corporations issued no stock certificates, held no meetings, and kept no
books. While remarking on those facts, the court rested its finding of "non-corporateness" not on corporate inactivity but on the lack of business purpose. Of
incidental interest is the fact that this same court, in spite of its sophistication in
tax matters, has upon at least one other occasion applied the business purpose
doctrine in a most mysterious fashion, Commissioner v. Transport Trading Co.
Term. Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950).
GoThe court felt uncomfortable enough about the non sequitur to state that
the Commissioner might recognize the "corporateness" in order to treat the loss
as one arising upon a corporate dissolution and yet disregard the corporateness
in order to avoid treating the loss as a bad debt loss. Given the court's reasoning
and a corporation which sells its property and then liquidates, might the Corn-
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Recently, in its opinion in the Ruspyn case (No. 5), the Tax Court
has given some slight indication of backing away from its earlier view
that business purpose is immaterial. The court found "that there
was good business reason for the issuance of debt securities,"3' because the corporation was organized on account of continued difficulties in doing business in a non-corporate form. Of course the new
corporation could have issued stock or debt, and the business reason
for its organization did not prompt the debt versus stock choice.
Perhaps the court did not mean to pose any business purpose requirement for debt as compared with stock; using inadvertent language, the Tax Court probably was implying a business purpose only
for incorporating. In so doing, it perhaps took a cue from the darkness
shed by the O'Neill opinion. Given two situations with identical
factors except that there is a business reason for debt rather than
stock present in the first but absent in the second, it is difficult to
conceive of the debt in the first case being converted into stock in
the second.
A counsellor planning a thin incorporation can take little assurance of stockholder advances being recognized as debt if that assurance must be based on his conviction that the O'Neill view requiring a business purpose for incorporating is wrong, however much he
might take comfort in that conviction were he in litigation. His assurance at the planning stage must rest on the peculiar facts of the
O'Neill case and on the proposition that in almost every situation a
business purpose for incorporating does exist. The Tax Court suggestion in Ruspyn that there must be a business purpose for debt as
contrasted with stock was no doubt inadvertent.
SUMMARY AND

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS

The principal tax advantage of incorporating thin is the opportunity of scaling down stock investment without the necessity of paying dividend taxes on withdrawals from the corporation. This thinning may be done by the new stockholders withholding assets from
transfer to the corporation, with or without outside loans to the corporation, and/or by their taking back corporate debt obligations as well
as stock. Thinning should be planned at the time of incorporation,
missioner push a mite further and recognize the corporateness and thus preclude

a loss to the stockholder individually on the corporate sale, and still not recognize
the corporateness and thus preclude both a stock and a bad debt loss?
5CCH T.C. SFRV. DFc. 119,112, p. 2839.
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since it will seldom be feasible to reduce capital after a corporation
has operated.
The Commissioner has not attempted in any reported case to
treat debt incurred at the time of incorporation as stock and thus
impose under Section 115 (g) an ordinary dividend tax on repayments of that debt. Since, however, a taxpayer has recently succeeded
in having such repayments treated as stock dividends, this singular
omission will certainly not continue.
The Commissioner has frequently treated debt as stock for purposes other than a tax under Section 115 (g). The cases indicate that
a stockholder debt to capital ratio of more than 4:1 is likely to result in stock treatment, while a smaller ratio is likely to result in debt
recognition. The 4:1 ratio is suggested as a helpful guide but not as
a rule, particularly since there are many factors bearing upon the
debt versus stock question.
The unfavorable significance of those other factors has been considered. Proper advance planning will generally eliminate at least
some of them. Those remaining should suggest a paring down of
the 4:1 ratio. In any event, pushing the ratio above 2:1 results in
little additional tax advantage, and in most cases proper planning
will not permit a larger stockholder debt structure.
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